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The role of consciousness in Pavlovian conditioning was examined in two experiments
in which visually masked neutral words were used as the conditioned stimuli (CS) and
an electric shock as the unconditioned stimulus (US). The inter-stimulus interval (ISI)
was established individually. A detection threshold was used in Experiment 1 and an
identification threshold in Experiment 2. The primary dependent variable was the skin
conductance response (SCR). Results showed that the conditioned response (CR) was
acquired by 58% of participants who perceived stimuli above the identification threshold,
50% of participants who perceived stimuli below the detection threshold, and 11% of
participants who perceived stimuli below the identification threshold, but above the
detection threshold. These results suggest that consciousness of the CS-US contingency
is not a necessary condition for acquiring a CR of the autonomous nervous system (ANS).
Keywords: Pavlovian conditioning, backward masking, subliminal perception, conscious
and unconscious learning
Se analizó el papel de la consciencia en el condicionamiento pavloviano mediante dos
experimentos en los que se utilizaron, como estímulos condicionados (ECs), palabras
neutras visualmente enmascaradas y, como estímulo incondicionado (EI), un shock eléctrico.
El intervalo inter-estímulo se estableció individualmente. Se utilizó un umbral de detección
en el Experimento 1 y un umbral de identificación en el Experimento 2. La principal variable
dependiente fue la respuesta de conductancia de la piel. Los resultados mostraron que
la respuesta condicionada (RC) fue adquirida por el 58% de los sujetos que percibieron
los estímulos por encima del umbral de identificación, por el 50% de los sujetos que
percibieron los estímulos por debajo del umbral de detección y por el 11% de los sujetos
que percibieron los estímulos por debajo del umbral de identificación, pero por encima
del umbral de detección. Estos resultados sugieren que la conciencia de la contingencia
EC-EI no es condición necesaria para adquirir una RC del sistema nervioso autónomo.
Palabras clave: condicionamiento pavloviano, enmascaramiento hacia atrás, percepción
subliminal, aprendizaje consciente e inconsciente
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The role of awareness in human learning has been
studied in Pavlovian conditioning, as well as in instrumental
conditioning, and continues to be a controversial issue.
Whereas some authors argue that conditioning cannot occur
without the intervention of consciousness (Davey, 1992a),
others maintain that its presence is not necessary (Berry,
1994). One possible explanation for this controversy could
be the diversity of the methods used to prevent
consciousness, so that it is difficult to compare the results
from different studies. Three methodological problems tend
to be addressed in this type of study: (a) how to prevent the
participant from being aware of relevant contingency, (b)
how and when to measure consciousness, and (c) the
interference between conscious and unconscious activity.
With regard to the first methodological problem,
techniques employed to prevent consciousness vary greatly
and have different degrees of efficiency. They include: (a)
generating false expectations in participants, (b) conditioning
instrumental responses unnoticeable to participants, (c)
implicit learning techniques, (d) working with participants
in altered states of consciousness, (e) working with
participants who have cerebral alterations, and (f) presenting
the CS with subliminal perceptual techniques.
Generating false expectations in participants. This
technique has been used in instrumental conditioning of
simple responses with contradictory results. Whereas Svartdal
and Mortensen (1993) found positive results (an instrumental
response appeared without signs of consciousness of relevant
contingency), Shanks and Dickinson (1991) did not (a
conditioned response [CR] did not appear, or there were
signs of consciousness). Some authors question the efficiency
of this technique because the participants’ possible false
expectations or other perceptions of the task could be useful
to predict the appearance of the reinforcement stimulus
(Shanks, Green, & Kolodny, 1994).
Conditioning instrumental responses unnoticeable to
participants (small muscular contractions, cortical potentials,
etc.). Although several authors have found positive results
(Hefferline & Keenan, 1961), this technique raises a doubt
over whether perception of reinforcement stimuli could
induce the acquisition of conscious responses that influence
the unnoticeable responses in the expected direction.
Implicit learning techniques. In a set of techniques known
as implicit learning—instrumental conditioning of complex
responses—(e.g., Shanks, et al., 1994), the success of the
task depends on a complex rule for concealing the response-
reinforcement relationship from the participant. Examples
of these tasks include classifying words according to an
artificial grammar, predicting the appearance of a stimulus
in a sequence, or controlling a complex system. In recent
years, this approach has been most fruitful, despite
discrepancies among authors. The differences between those
who found positive results (Lee, 1995; Turner & Fischler,
1993) and those who obtained negative results (Meulemans
& Van der Linder, 1997; Perruchet, Gallego, & Pacteau,
1992; Shanks et al., 1994) lie in the complexity of the rule
used, as greater complexity implies less likelihood of
participants being conscious of the relationship between
response and reinforcement. Another problem that emerges
is that, although the rule will be learned unconsciously, signs
of consciousness could appear because participants know
the stimuli presented, the responses, and their effects,
enabling them, with practice, to deduce and verbalize some
of the rule’s keys (Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986;
Hayes & Broadbent, 1988).
Working with participants in altered consciousness states
(dream, coma, anesthesia, hypnosis, etc.). The studies that
have used this technique also obtained contradictory results.
Thus, some authors found positive results (Jelicic, Bonke,
Wolters, & Phaf, 1992), whereas others found negative results
(Ghoneim, Block, & Fowles, 1992). A number of authors
maintain that this technique does not guarantee that
participants do not experience some moment of consciousness
during task performance (Andrade, 1995).
Working with participants who have cerebral alterations
(visual agnosia, amnesia, etc.). This approach allows
researchers to know which neurological processes are related
to the conscious and unconscious aspects of assigned tasks
(Bechara et al., 1995; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1997; LeDoux, 1990, 1996; Tranel & Damasio, 1993). In
addition, positive results have been found when eliciting CRs
with amnesiacs who did not remember either the conditioned
stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US) association or the
learning context (Daum, Channon, & Canavar, 1989; Gabrieli
et al. 1995). However, this technique is problematic because
available individuals are scarce, and it is always dubious
whether the results can be generalized to healthy participants. 
Presenting CSs with subliminal perceptual techniques.
The use of these techniques arguably solves some of the
problems that emerge with the previous techniques. Their
efficiency for preventing the perception of CSs and for
eliciting, without consciousness, a previously-acquired CR
has been studied in depth (Corteen & Wood, 1972; Lazarus
& Mc Cleary, 1951; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 1994).
However, these techniques have seldom been employed
during the CR acquisition phase, except in research on
evaluative conditioning (Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 1993;
De Houwer, Hendrickx, & Baeyens, 1997; Levey & Martin,
1975). The results obtained in these studies have not always
been positive (Cohen, 1964; Davey, 1994; Shanks &
Dickinson, 1990). Critics of these techniques tend to point
out visual masking as the most reliable technique because
it enables an objective measure of consciousness and one
that is simultaneous with task performance, as participants
must pay attention to relevant stimuli (Holender, 1986).
The second methodological problem is when and how
to measure consciousness. If consciousness is measured at
the end of the acquisition phase, participants may forget or
mix up contingencies, or answer negatively because they
are uncertain due to the time that has elapsed (Holender,
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1986; Shanks et al., 1994). On the other hand, if
consciousness is measured during the acquisition phase, the
researcher’s questions may cause the participant to pay
attention to relevant contingencies that had hitherto gone
unnoticed (Greenspoon, 1963).
With regard to how to measure consciousness, several
authors favor objective measures over participative ones.
Even so, there are discrepancies about how to interpret which
results are the consequence of conscious information
processing and which are the consequence of unconscious
processing (Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
The third methodological problem is the interference
between conscious and unconscious activity. Unconscious
learning cannot be deemed possible while working with
consciously-perceived stimuli, because consciousness is
participating, albeit in a quite passive way; or at least, it is
not possible to ensure that unconscious learning will be the
same when consciousness does not participate in the process.
Conscious perception fosters association among stimuli, as
only the stimulus that has been selected from among all
those activated at the unconscious level breaks into the
consciousness (Marcel, 1983b). Thus, it would be appropriate
to inquire if any of the potential unconscious conditionings
would have been as quick if all the semantic elements related
to each stimulus used during the task had had to be kept
activated. In addition, as unconscious processing works
basically in parallel, CR acquisition could have been
supported, as all stimuli are processed sequentially by
consciousness and, hence, it is easier to establish the CS-US
contingency. That is, whereas it is not guaranteed that the
unconscious system is capable of learning by itself, it would
be premature to relegate to second place, the role of
consciousness in this type of procedure. On the other hand,
if consciously-controlled motor responses are used (Grant,
1973; Montare, 1992), participants can deduce the relevant
contingency by analyzing their behavior, so that learning
may seem conscious when it was in fact achieved
unconsciously (Baer & Fuhrer, 1982).
Contradictory results can also be ascribed to interference
between conscious and unconscious processes. Thus, when
consciousness is not prevented at all, or when participants
do not assume some degree of passivity during the task, the
effects of unconsciously-processed information tend to be
inhibited, both in subliminal perception (Dixon, 1981;
Landis, Christen, & Graves, 1992; Marcel, 1983a; Snodgrass,
Shevrin, & Kopka, 1993; Van Selst & Merikle, 1993) and
in conditioning (Baron & Galizio, 1983; Berry 1994; Lowe,
1983; Ross, Ferreira, & Ross, 1974; Shimoff, Catania, &
Matthews, 1981; Svartdal, 1992).
The dissociation effect paradigm (Debner & Jacoby,
1994; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995) has solved the
interference problem in perceptual and memory tasks due
to the control that can be exercised over consciously-
processed information and the impossibility of controlling
unconsciously-processed information. However, this
technique is not applicable to conditioning, as participants
cannot be requested to not associate contingently-presented
stimuli; nor can their autonomous nervous systems (ANS)
be prevented from responding to the CS+. If they are
requested to not respond when the CR is controlled by the
central nervous system, they may respond regardless of
whether or not they perceive the relevant contingency.
Conditioning ANS responses to unconsciously-perceived
CSs over which participants have no direct control, reduces
the intervention of consciousness in the task as much as
possible, as well as alleviating the problem of interference
between conscious and unconscious activity.
Öhman is indisputably one of the leading authors in this
field. Using visually-masked fear-relevant stimuli (snakes,
spiders, or pictures of angry faces) as the CS+, an electric
shock as the US, and skin conductance response (SCR) as
the CR, Öhman and his team examined both the possibility
of eliciting, without participants’ consciousness, previous
consciously-acquired CRs (Öhman & Soares, 1993; Soares
& Öhman, 1993a, 1993b), and the possibility of acquiring
CRs without consciousness (Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, &
Öhman, 1994; Öhman, 1998; Öhman & Soares, 1998). The
results of this research seem to confirm that both elicitation
and acquisition of CRs without consciousness are possible
only if fear-relevant stimuli are used as the CS. Nevertheless,
the methodology used in most cases does not guarantee the
unconscious perception of stimuli stipulated by some authors
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Holender, 1986; Merikle, 1982;
Reingold & Merikle, 1988). Although Esteves and Öhman
(1993) attempted to validate their method, they did not do
so by gradually reducing the exposition times until reaching
the perceptual threshold of each participant, nor did they
carry out a sufficient number of trials, and some signs of
stimulus discrimination appeared when objective measures
of consciousness were taken, so that certain doubts about
their results persist. They also tended to use identification
tasks as a measure of consciousness, thus preventing
unconscious processing of neutral stimuli (Dagenbach, Carr,
& Wilhelmsen, 1989). Moreover, they used the same number
of reinforced trials for the CS+ and CS– during the acquisition
phase, leading to the conclusion that masked fear-relevant
stimuli facilitate CR acquisition sooner than do neutral stimuli;
however, it cannot be asserted that the CR cannot be acquired
from masked neutral stimuli. It may simply be necessary to
perform more trials in order to achieve this.
Our objective was to test the hypothesis that considers
consciousness of the CS-US contingency a necessary
condition for CR acquisition by the ANS in human Pavlovian
conditioning using masked neutral visual stimuli as the CS.
The presentation threshold was calculated so that it met all
the requirements established by reviewers of unconscious
perception (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Holender, 1986;
Merikle, 1982; Reingold & Merikle, 1988). The measurement
of consciousness used throughout the experimental phases
was simultaneous with the appearance of stimuli.
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Experiment 1
In this experiment, visually-masked words were used as
the CS and the presentation threshold was established
individually. Differential trace conditioning was performed
during a large number of trials using a shock as the aversive
US. Each response to the CS+ was compared with the
average of the responses to the CS– in order to detect the
CR as soon as possible. A restrictive CR-acquisition criterion
was also established to prevent spontaneous SCRs of high
amplitude as well as the CS+ from being considered the CR.
Method
Participants
The original group was made up of 43 volunteer students
(11 male and 32 female), from a first-year Psychology
course, with a mean age of 18.7 years (range 17-28 years).
They received credits in the subject “Psychology of
Learning” for participating in the experiment. All participants
had normal vision or vision that had been corrected to
normal. Seven participants were excluded or dropped out
for various reasons, so that the final group included 36
participants (9 male and 27 female). Eighteen participants
were assigned, at random, to each experimental group.
Apparatus and Material
The experiment was carried out in two contiguous
Faraday cabins in the Psychology Faculty Laboratory at the
Complutense University of Madrid. Both cabins were kept
dimly lit and at a constant temperature (21 ± 2ºC).
Stimuli were presented by means of a tachistoscope
(Gerbrands, model G1130—lamp driver 403). The distance
between the surface of the stimulus and the participant’s
eyes was 78.74 cm (31 inches). Maximum vision angle was
approximately 5º. The mask was placed in one field, the
blank card in the second, and in the third field, the two
words used as the CS were presented alternately and at
random to each group. A trained assistant changed the cards
when appropriate. Before each trial, a light indicated the
beginning of a stimulus sequence. The lighting for each field
was constant during the experiment (mask field = 2.6 cd/m2;
blank field = 1 cd/m2; word field = 1.1 cd/m2).
The SCR was recorded with a polygraph (Lafayette
model Li-76400 type B 7603-1A). Silver-chromed electrodes
were placed on the middle phalanxes of the index and ring
fingers of the non-dominant hand, with the middle finger
between them to prevent the electrodes from coming into
contact accidentally. Beforehand, the fingers were cleaned
with alcohol and a fine coat of conducting gel was applied
(Venables & Christie, 1980).
An audio generator (VIZ W-504B/441) and amplifier
(Lafayette model Li-15010) emitted the tone that served as
a signal for participants to press the correct key on the
keyboard placed near their dominant hand. The keyboard
was specifically made for this experiment, having only two
keys: Word/Blank. An electric shock generator (Mark 100)
was used to produce the US. Experimental events were
controlled by a PC running specially-designed software.
Words used as the CS were printed in black on a white
background, each letter was 12 mm high and 8-9 mm wide,
and the strokes were 2 mm thick. The two words that were
used (“Magnesio” [Magnesium] and “Locuacidad”
[Loquaciousness]) have a usage frequency of 1 in Spanish
according Mighetto and Rosengren (1984), and of 0
according to Alphonse and Rodríguez (1964). The two words
each have only one meaning according to the Royal Spanish
Academy (1994), and are between 6 and 10 letters long.
The mask pattern was ten letters long (XOXOXOXOXO).
Variables and Design
A 2  2 factorial design, with repeated measures in the last
factor, was employed. The first factor was a presentation of the
CS, with two levels: above the conscious threshold (conscious
group) or below the conscious threshold (unconscious group).
The second factor was the word-shock relationship, with two
levels: associated (CS+) or not associated (CS–) with a shock
(US). Within each group, the word that acted as the CS+ was
balanced, with one word acting as the CS+ for 50% of the
participants and the other word for the rest.
The dependent variable was acquisition of the
conditioned response (CR), measured by two approaches.
First, the SCR amplitude during the 4 s subsequent to the
CS+ should be significantly greater than the mean amplitude
of responses to the CS–, according to the inequality of
Chebychev (1874) with K = 2.23 (see Sachs, 1969). Likken
and Venables’ (1971) and Likken’s correction (1972) were
applied to the SCR before statistical analysis, and all
calculations were updated each time a new maximum value
of the SCR appeared. Second, it was considered that the
CR had been acquired when the amplitude of two SCRs
following the CS+ was significantly greater than the mean
amplitude following the CS– according to the first approach,
and provided that between these two SCRs not more than
one CS+ had appeared with an insignificant SCR1.
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1 With this CR acquisition criterion, the maximum probability that the CR could be acquired randomly was p = .000021 for Experiment
1 and p = .000087 for Experiment 2. (With only the first approach, p = .013 for normal distributions and p = .1 for the rest of the
distributions. Obviously, a higher value for K had reduced the strength of the comparison to practically zero; moreover, a response of
more than three standard deviations above the SCR average is not expected with a non-painful stimulus).
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Other dependent variables were measured to detect
differences between conscious and unconscious conditioning:
the number of trials needed to acquire the CR and regularity
of CR acquisition (two or three consecutive trials with the
CS+).
The possible effect of the shock on detection of the CS+
was measured by the percentage of correct answers to that
stimulus. It must be taken into account that the presence of
the CS+ could be discriminated effectively without the total
percentage of correct answers being above random.
Procedure
Before the experimental stage, all participants completed
several tests to measure personality (16PF; Cattell, 1949),
intelligence (Domino-48 Intelligence Test; Anstey & Pichot,
1955), attention (Test de percepciones y diferencias - Caras
[Test of Perceptions and Differences-Faces]; Thurstone &
Yela, 1968), and locus of control (LUCAM; Pelechano &
Baguena, 1983).
The experimental stage consisted of three phases: the
threshold establishment phase, the CR acquisition phase,
and the extinction phase. 
Threshold establishment phase. First, participants
experienced a period of habituation to experimental conditions.
During this period of approximately 10-15 min, participants
received initial instructions and underwent a brief training
period of 20 trials to check whether they had understood the
task, to familiarize themselves with the apparatus and laboratory
conditions and to stabilize their SCR. Subsequently, the
threshold establishment phase began, in which the visual
perceptual threshold was calculated for each participant by
variations in the inter-stimulus interval (ISI). The approximate
duration of this phase was 90-120 min. Stimulus presentation
was random. A height-adjustable chair was used to guarantee
that vision was centered on the screen. At the beginning of
each trial, a light in the center of the screen signaled
participants to pay attention. Instructions were read aloud to
each participant. They were told they must respond only after
hearing a low tone through their earphones. This tone sounded
five seconds after the mask went off. This guaranteed that
recording of the SCR would not be affected by movement to
press a key (although this movement was carried out with the
hand that was not connected to the electrodes), nor by the
decision about which key to press (Lazarus & McCleary, 1951).
If participants did not respond within three seconds after the
tone, or the response had not been recorded, a second, longer
tone was emitted to remind them that they had to respond.
The duration of the card (Word or Blank) was 10 ms,
and the mask lasted 50 ms. The inter-trial interval was
varied, with an average of 20 s (range 15-25s). Duration of
the interval allowed the SCR to return to its initial level
(see Venables & Christie, 1980).
The perceptual threshold of each participant was fixed
when accuracy of responses was not above the probability of
responding correctly at random. The procedure used to calculate
this was that found to be the most rigorous and effective by
Dagenbach et al. (1989), and it also fulfilled all the conditions
established by Merikle (1982). The participants’ task consisted
of emitting detection judgments about the presence or absence
of a word on the screen. That is, participants simply had to
differentiate whether the flash of light corresponded to a blank
screen or to a screen with a word by pressing the appropriate
key (Blank/Word) on the keyboard with the hand controlled
by the dominant hemisphere.
Participants were informed about the frequency with
which the stimuli would appear (50% Blanks and 50%
Words, of which 25% corresponded to one word and 25%
to the other), and they were requested to try to maintain a
similar distribution in their responses. For this purpose, they
were informed about the number of each type of responses
they had given after each trial. They were told that when
they thought they were responding at random, they should
try to adjust the frequency of their responses to the real
appearance-frequency of the stimuli, and that they should
always give a response.
The experiment began with blocks of 8 trials (4 blanks
and 4 words) distributed at random, and the initial duration
of the ISI (50 ms) was reduced according to the following
criteria: 
1. If the number of correct responses was ≥ 5, the ISI
was shortened by 5 ms (until 10 ms was reached, after which
it was reduced by 2 ms each time); then the process started
over again. If the number of correct responses was ≤ 4, a
block of 20 trials was presented under the same conditions. 
2. If the number of correct responses in this block was
≥ 12, the ISI was reduced and the process began over again,
and if the number of correct responses was < 12, this ISI
duration was established as the participant’s perceptual
threshold. 
3. Final checking: Two blocks of 20 trials were presented
at the established ISI. In the first block, the task was also
to emit detection judgments. If the number of correct
responses was ≥ 12, the ISI was reduced and the process
began over again; if the number of correct answers was <
12, the following block was presented. In this block, the
task consisted of identifying words. Participants had to say
out loud the word they thought they had seen when they
responded “Word.” Participants were requested to say the
first word they thought of if they believed they were
responding at random, which occurred in most cases. At the
beginning of this block, the two words used up to that point
were changed for different ones that the participants had
not seen previously. If participants identified a word correctly,
or if the number of correct responses was 12 in the detection
judgments, the ISI was reduced and the process started over
again; otherwise this phase ended.
Participants were informed about the level of accuracy of
their responses after each block in order to maintain a high
level of motivation and to enable them to distinguish the
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correct criteria they had used to respond (Cheesman & Merikle
1984). Although the presentation order of stimuli was random,
the same stimulus could only appear a maximum of two times
consecutively (Soares & Öhman, 1993a, 1993b). Participants
had a 5-10 min break after this phase.
CR acquisition phase. This phase also began with an
adjustment phase lasting roughly 15 min. This period was
used to determine the intensity and duration of the US. The
intensity of the shock (US) was established individually for
each participant until a sensation reported as “clearly
uncomfortable but not painful” was evoked. In addition,
participants were instructed to indicate, if necessary, a change
in the shock intensity during the experiment. Next, they
were reminded that they were free to leave the experiment
at any stage without any negative consequences to them.
Lastly, they were informed that the shocks would be
administered at random and that they should not use this as
criterion to respond. The participant’s task was detection
judgments as in the first phase (in accordance with the
criteria established by Cheesman and Merikle, 1984) and
they had another training period of 20 trials to become
familiar with the electrode and shock.
Next, participants completed a maximum of 5 blocks of
20 trials. The maximum duration of this phase was
approximately 1 hr. The word used as the CS+ was associated
with the US 100% of the time. Stimuli were presented below
or above the perceptual threshold according to the conscious
level attributed to each group. Stimuli were presented at the
ISI established for each participant in the unconscious group
and at 50 ms in the conscious group (except for two
participants in this group, to whom stimuli were presented
at 100 ms because their thresholds were 50 ms and 45 ms,
respectively).
The number of correct responses could be measured trial-
by-trial because the task consisted of detection judgments,
as in the first phase. All participants in the unconscious group
who responded correctly above random were identified and
removed from the group immediately, so that non-
consciousness was guaranteed for as long as possible.
The sequence of stimulus presentation was similar to
that of the first phase, adhering to the guidelines established
by Cheesman and Merikle (1984). The only difference was
the presentation of the US 4 s after the CS+ (Marcos, 1997).
This time period was used to record the SCR from the first
interval (FIR) (Prokasy & Ebel, 1967).
Software was designed to finalize this phase when the
participant reached the CR acquisition criterion in order to
ensure that all participants went on to the extinction phase
with the same index of CR reinforcement. 
Extinction phase. Only participants who reached the CR
acquisition criterion before 100 trials carried on to this phase.
The shocker was turned off at the beginning of this phase and
participants were informed about US withdrawal to prevent
the experiment from being extended unnecessarily (Davey,
1992b). There are some studies in which the CR is maintained
even when participants know that the US is absent (Fuhrer &
Baer, 1980; Wong et al., 1994). This phase ended when the
CR failed to appear in the last three trials with the CS+.
Finally, participants answered a series of questions to
detect possible biases that could have affected the
development of the experiment and to measure the subjective
consciousness of the CS–US contingency.
Results
CR Acquisition
The data showed that 50% of the participants who
remained working at a non-conscious level, and 11% of the
participants who worked at a conscious level, reached the
CR acquisition criterion. The difference in the percentage
of participants who reached the CR acquisition criterion
under each separate condition was statistically significant
(a ≤ .05) according to Fisher’s non-parametric exact one-
tail test, p = .05.
Table 1
Experiment 1. Percentage of Participants Who Did and Did
Not Reach the CR Acquisition Criterion
CR Acquisition
Group
Yes No
Conscious 11% (n = 2) 89% (n = 16)  
Unconscious 50% (n = 4) 50% (n = 4)
Figure 1. Sequence of stimulus presentation. Values under each element indicate its duration (s/ms) or its intensity (Hz). In the case of
the ISI, its initial value appears. Each time the CS+ appeared, a shock was presented in the fifth second after the mask and when SCR
recording was over.
Point                       W/B           ISI    Mask  SCR      Tone 1                    Decision       Tone 2
2 s   Black 1 10 ms Black 2      50 ms Black 3 500 ms 3 s max.                      6.5 s
5 s                       50 ms                        5 s       1000 Hz                                    1000 Hz
If CS+          ➡ US 5th s
(0-4s)
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CR Extinction
There were no statistically significant differences in CR
extinction between each kind of conditioning, because all
participants who reached the CR acquisition criterion stopped
responding to the CS+ during the first three trials in which
this stimulus appeared in this phase.
Variability and Stability of Visual Perceptual
Threshold
Individual variability of the perceptual threshold differed
between the participants who had to be rejected by reducing
ISI to 0 ms and the participants who did not discriminate
above random with ISI = 50 ms (for final participants: M
= 22 ms, SD = 14 ms, Max. = 50 ms, Min. = 5 ms, N =
36). The stability of the perceptual threshold was very poor.
Fifty-five percent of the participants from the unconscious
group were excluded in the CR acquisition phase because
their perception was above random.
Stimulus Discrimination and CR Acquisition
Participants who remained working at a non-conscious
level maintained a below-random CS+ detection level. No
differences were found between participants who reached the
CR acquisition criterion and those who did not for perceptual
discrimination (Mann-Whitney’s U = 5.5, p = .48, for
percentage of correct responses, 49% and 47%, respectively,
and U = 6, p = .68, for percentage of CS+ detection, 40%
and 47%, respectively). Two of the participants from the
unconscious group, who reached the CR acquisition criterion,
detected a word once in the presence of two CSs+ that
triggered the CRs with which they reached the CR acquisition
criterion (50% accuracy), and another two participants
responded that there was a blank on the screen in both trials
(0% accuracy). Thus, even in these particular trials, participants
who remained working at a non-conscious level and reached
the CR acquisition criterion did not perceive the CS+.
Participants from the conscious group who reached the
CR acquisition criterion had considerably higher percentages
of correct responses and CS+ detection than the rest of the
participants from their group (U = 0, p = .013, for percentage
of correct responses, 96% and 71%, respectively, and U =
0, p = .013, for percentage of CS+ detection, 97% and 72%,
respectively). In addition, they responded correctly in the
presence of two CSs+ that triggered the CRs, at which level
they reached the CR acquisition criterion.
Discussion
These results indicate that it is possible to condition the
CR without participants’ consciousness of the CS–US
contingency. The low percentage of participants from the
conscious group who reached the CR acquisition criterion
suggests that the CRs of the ANS are more easily acquired
than stimuli not perceived consciously, unless a very
restrictive conscious threshold (detection judgments) is used.
Participants from the conscious group simply discriminated
whether or not there was something on the screen, but they
were unable to identify what it was and, as a result, could
barely capture the CS–US relationship.
Dagenbach et al. (1989) postulate that the task used to
measure consciousness could inhibit priming effects, and
could therefore also affect conditioning. This is why
identification judgments were used to measure consciousness
in the second experiment, whose design was similar to that
of Experiment 1.
Many studies have found that only when participants
adopt a passive attitude during the task, do the effects of
unconsciously processed information appear (Dagenbach et
al., 1989; Dixon 1981; Landis et al., 1992; Marcel, 1983a,
1983b; Snodgras et al., 1993; Van Selst & Merikle, 1993).
Identification judgments force participants to offer responses
about what they see and, as they see something, they remain
alert in an attempt to identify what is presented to them.
Staying alert prevents unconscious information from being
used in this situation. In these cases, the accuracy of
consciously-generated hypotheses will determine whether
the CR can be acquired or not. Participants who perceive
clearly will be more accurate in their expectations, and will
acquire the CR more easily. Participants who do not perceive
clearly will generate incorrect hypotheses, and will find it
more difficult to reach the CR acquisition criterion.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
The original group consisted of 29 volunteer students (4
male and 25 female) from the first-year Psychology course,
with a mean age of 18 years (range 17-25). Participants were
different from those who took part in Experiment 1, but had
similar characteristics. As five participants were excluded
or dropped out for various reasons, the final group numbered
24 (20 female and 4 male), and these were divided at random
into two experimental groups (12 participants per group).
Apparatus and Material
The same apparatus was employed as in Experiment 1.
Experimental Design
The same conditions were maintained as in Experiment
1, except that the task involved identification judgments.
Procedure
All phases were identical to those in Experiment 1,
except for the thresholds establishment phase. This phase
lasted approximately 90 min. The lighting of the Blank
(Non-word) field was varied to match the Word field, as
this time words were presented in both fields. The fields
were as follows: Non-word field = 1.1 cd/m2, Word field =
1.1 cd/m2, and Mask field = 2.6 cd/m2.
Participants were informed about the appearance frequency
of words: 25% for Word 1 (Magnesio), 25% for Word 2
(Locuacidad), 25% for Non-word 1 (Mengisao), and 25% for
Non-word 2 (Lidocaduca). This time, the keyboard had three
keys and participants were requested to press the “M” key if
they thought they had seen Word 1, the “L” key if they thought
they had seen Word 2, and the “NOT” key if they thought that
they had seen either of the non-words. Only identification
judgments on words with meaning were considered correct or
incorrect. When participants pressed the “NOT” key, they were
not requested to identify which of the two non-words had been
presented. Thus, the probability of obtaining correct responses
at random was 50% and the frequency appearance of the CS+
in the second phase was 25%, the same as in Experiment 1.
The sequence of stimulus presentation mirrored that of
Experiment 1, but to enable the identification of words, the
initial value of the ISI was 200 ms and, as the maximum number
of correct responses was lower, the ISI was reduced as follows:
1. In blocks of eight trials, if the number of correct
responses was ≥ 3, the ISI was shortened by 5 ms (until 10
ms was reached, after which it was reduced by 2 ms each
time) and the process began over again. If the number of
correct responses was ≤ 3, a block of 20 trials was presented
under the same conditions.
2. If the number of correct responses in this block was
≥ 6, the ISI was reduced and the process began over again.
If the number of correct responses was < 6, this ISI duration
was established as the participant’s perceptual threshold.
3. Final checking: Two blocks of 20 trials were presented
at the established ISI. If the number of correct answers was
> 6 in either of the two blocks, the ISI was reduced and the
process started again. If the number of correct responses was
≤ 6 in both blocks, the participant passed to the next phase.
Results
CR Acquisition
The data showed that 10% of the participants who
remained working at an unconscious level (n = 1) and 58%
of the participants who worked at a conscious level (n = 7)
reached the CR acquisition criterion. The difference in the
percentage of participants who reached the CR acquisition
criterion under each condition was statistically significant
(a ≤ .05) according to Fisher’s exact one-tail test, p = .02.
CR Extinction
All of the participants who reached the CR acquisition
criterion ceased responding to the CS+ during the first three
trials in which this stimulus appeared in this phase.
Variability and Stability of Perceptual Threshold
Individual variability of the ISIs also differed among
participants who had to be excluded, as the ISI was reduced
to 0 ms, or participants did not discriminate above random
with an ISI = 200 ms (for final participants M = 36 ms, SD
= 21 ms, Max. = 100 ms, Min. = 15 ms, N = 24). The
stability of the perceptual threshold was higher than in
Experiment 1; only 16% of the participants from the
unconscious group were excluded in the acquisition phase
due to above-random perception.
CR Acquisition and Stimulus Discrimination
Participants who remained working at a non-conscious
level maintained a below-random identification level of the
CS+. The only participant from this group who acquired the
CR had a lower percentage of correct responses (26%) and
CS+ identification (20%) than those obtained by the rest of
participants from this group (33% and 32%, respectively).
This data indicates that this individual’s perception was
poorer than that of the rest. Furthermore, this participant
also failed to identify the CS+ in both of the trials in which
the CRs appeared, at which level the CR acquisition criterion
was reached.
In the conscious group, no statistically significant
differences emerged between participants who reached the
CR acquisition criterion and those who did not (84% and
81%, respectively, for percentage of correct responses, U =
16.5, p = .87; and 83% and 73%, respectively, for CS+
identification, U = 10, p = .26).
Discussion
Most participants who performed below the
identification threshold did not reach the CR acquisition
criterion, whereas a high percentage of those who performed
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Table 2
Experiment 2. Percentage of Participants Who Did and Did
Not Reach the CR Acquisition Criterion
CR Acquisition
Group
Yes No
Conscious 58% (n = 7) 42% (n = 5)  
Unconscious 10% (n = 1) 90% (n = 9)
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above the identification threshold (perceiving words
perfectly) did. These results are the opposite of the
proportion obtained in Experiment 1. The objective
consciousness concept considered to establish the perceptual
threshold, regardless of the type of task used, is not
sufficiently capable of explaining all the data, as it generates
paradoxical results. The usefulness of this concept is
restricted to measuring the limits of detection and
identification thresholds.
The task of measuring a participant’s consciousness
seems to be the most relevant factor influencing the
appearance or nonappearance of unconsciously-processed
information effects. Contradictions in studies about
subliminal perception might be explained by the different
tasks used. Hence, when the identification threshold was
used, the effects of unconsciously-processed information
did not appear (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Merikle, 1982;
Reingold & Merikle, 1988), and when the detection threshold
was used, the effects of unconsciously-processed information
did appear (Dagenbach et al., 1989; Marcel, 1983a). For the
same reason, Öhman and his team might have failed to
achieve unconscious conditioning to neutral stimuli. They
usually used a threshold of a similar length (30 ms) to the
average identification threshold obtained in our experiment
(Öhman & Soares, 1993, 1998; Soares & Öhman, 1993a,
1993b).
Analysis of the Two Experiments
Initial Similarity of Experimental Groups
After carrying out the corresponding ANOVA on the 23
personality variables measured before the experimental phase
(16PF, Intelligence, Attention, and Locus of Control), no
statistically significant differences were identified among
any of the experimental groups for the two experiments
(taken separately as well as jointly). This suggests that
random distribution of participants generated similar groups
(see Table 3).
Table 3
Personality Variables: Means and Standard Deviations of the Experimental Groups for the Two Experiments (Taken Separately
as well as Jointly)
EXP 1 EXP 2 EXP 1 and 2
Unconscious       Conscious       Unconscious        Conscious         Null Perc.      Confused Perc.     Clear Perc.
Variable     
M SD M SD M SD  M SD M SD  M SD M SD
INTELL 31.39 5.782 30.67 5.531 31.42 3.942 31.83 4.239 31.39 5.782 30.97 4.895 31.83 4.239  
ATTEN 46.00 6.059 48.11 6.398 49.17 5.982 51.42 6.244 46.00 6.059 48.53 6.152 51.42 6.244
LOCUS 68.78 10.167 69.33 11.722 70.50 11.611 60.50 13.860 68.78 10.167 69.80 11.490 60.50 13.860
A 8.22 2.290 8.56 2.549 8.33 1.923 7.67 2.348 8.22 2.290 8.47 2.285 7.67 2.348
B 5.33 1.237 5.06 1.662 6.58 1.379 5.50 1.168 5.33 1.237 5.67 1.709 5.50 1.168
C 6.67 2.425 6.00 2.765 7.00 1.907 6.67 2.871 6.67 2.425 6.40 2.472 6.67 2.871
E 6.00 2.223 6.44 2.175 6.67 2.535 7.58 1.621 6.00 2.223 6.53 2.285 7.58 1.621
F 7.00 2.351 7.22 1.801 5.67 2.498 7.33 2.015 7.00 2.351 6.60 2.207 7.33 2.015
G 8.28 2.697 8.17 2.036 8.42 2.610 7.75 2.958 8.28 2.697 8.27 2.243 7.75 2.958
H 5.56 2.617 5.67 2.635 6.42 2.644 6.00 2.558 5.56 2.617 5.97 2.619 6.00 2.558
I 5.94 2.733 5.67 2.142 4.50 2.236 5.58 2.353 5.94 2.733 5.20 2.219 5.58 2.353
L 5.56 2.064 4.89 1.997 5.58 1.881 5.17 1.528 5.56 2.064 5.17 1.949 5.17 1.528
M 5.06 2.313 4.72 2.675 4.08 2.610 5.50 2.939 5.06 2.313 4.47 2.623 5.50 2.939
N 3.39 2.118 3.78 2.045 3.33 2.146 3.75 2.050 3.39 2.118 3.60 2.061 3.75 2.050
O 6.67 2.590 6.89 2.349 7.33 2.015 6.83 2.887 6.67 2.590 7.07 2.196 6.83 2.887
Q1 7.83 2.229 6.06 2.754 7.33 1.723 7.83 2.167 7.83 2.229 6.57 2.445 7.83 2.167
Q2 3.89 2.398 3.83 1.948 4.00 1.651 3.67 2.640 3.89 2.398 3.90 1.807 3.67 2.640
Q3 6.78 2.130 6.22 2.184 6.83 1.899 6.33 2.103 6.78 2.130 6.47 2.063 6.33 2.103
Q4 6.61 2.404 6.94 2.940 7.08 2.811 7.17 2.623 6.61 2.404 7.00 2.841 7.17 2.623
QI 5.978 1.4111 6.028 1.4712 6.192 1.2479 6.017 1.6895 5.978 1.4111 6.093 1.3661 6.017 1.6895
QII 6.139 1.6720 6.228 1.3208 6.042 1.4324 6.267 1.8396 6.139 1.6720 6.153 1.3452 6.267 1.8396
QIII 5.350 1.4509 5.117 1.5120 5.575 1.6344 5.000 1.5380 5.350 1.4509 5.300 1.5510 5.000 1.5380
QIV 5.978 1.7605 6.167 1.1882 6.917 1.6525 6.908 .9643 5.978 1.7605 6.467 1.4153 6.908 .9643
Note. Personality variables are: Intelligence, Attention, Locus of Control and 16PF. Null Perception =  below detection threshold. Confused
Perception = above detection threshold and below identification threshold. Clear Perception = above identification threshold.
CR Acquisition and Consciousness
The thresholds used in both experiments allow
differentiation of consciousness, as defined by three levels of
perception: (a) clear perception: participants who perceived
stimuli clearly (above identification threshold); (b) confused
perception: participants who perceived something but were
unable to identify it (below identification threshold and above
detection threshold); and (c) null perception: participants who
did not discriminate whether or not there was something on
the screen (below detection threshold). As can be seen in
Figure 2, data show that optimal settings for conditioning are
reached at both the clear (58% CR acquisition) and the null
level (50% CR acquisition), whereas conditioning is difficult
to acquire at the confused level (11% CR acquisition).
There were no statistically significant differences in CR
acquisition among participants who were acting at the clear
perception level and participants who were acting at the null
perception level, according Fisher’s exact test, p = .53. On
the other hand, there were significant differences between
participants who were acting at the confused perception level
and those who were acting at the clear perception level, p =
.003, and the null perception level, p = .03. The percentage
of participants who acquired the CR at the confused perception
level was significantly lower than that of participants who
acquired the CR at the clear and null perception levels.
Differences Between Conscious and Unconscious
Conditioning
If both experiments are taken into account, differences
between conscious and unconscious conditioning may be
established. Conscious conditioning is understood as that
which has been produced at the clear perception level, and
unconscious conditioning is that which has been produced
at the null perception level. Conditioning that occurred at
the confused perception level will be ignored for the purpose
of these comparisons. Thus, there were no statistically
significant differences between conscious and unconscious
conditioning regarding the number of trials needed to reach
the CR acquisition criterion, U = 9.5, p = .39, or the
regularity of reaching that criterion (Fisher’s exact test, p =
.46). Nevertheless, there was a trend for participants who
were acting at a conscious level to need fewer trials to reach
the CR acquisition criterion (M = 33, SD = 16, Max. = 60,
Min. = 11) than those acting at an unconscious level (M =
47, SD = 27, Max. = 84, Min. = 23). In addition, participants
who were acting at a conscious level reached the CR
acquisition criterion with greater regularity (the two CRs
appeared in two consecutive trials in 71% of cases) than
participants acting at an unconscious level (the two CRs
appeared in two consecutive trials in 28% of cases).
With regard to the personality variables measured, a single
statistically significant difference emerged between conscious
and unconscious conditioning: It was in the E factor of the
16PF, U = 3, p = .03. Participants who reached the CR
acquisition criterion unconsciously were more submissive
and conformist than those who reached it consciously.
Differences in Personality Variables Between
Participants Who Acquired the CR and Those 
Who Did Not
Within the null perception group, statistically significant
differences between participants who reached the CR
acquisition criterion and those who did not were found in two
factors of the 16PF: QIII, U = 0, p = .0; and Q3, U = 1, p =
.04. Participants who reached the CR acquisition criterion
accepted few obligations, were unconcerned about rules, and
acted in a spontaneous, lively, and impulsive way, according
to their needs (QIII factor). They expressed few concerns about
controlling their emotions, behavior, and image (Q3 factor).
Within the clear perception group, there was just one
statistically significant difference between participants who
reached the CR acquisition criterion and those who did not,
in Factor I of the 16PF, U = 4.5, p = .03. Participants who
reached the CR acquisition criterion were more realistic,
practical, and skeptical about subjective issues than those
who did not reach the CR acquisition criterion.
Relationship Between Subjective Consciousness of
CS–US Contingency and Perceptual Threshold
The questionnaire completed by participants after the
experiments indicated the absence of bias in their
performance. One of the items from this questionnaire asked
whether the participant had associated anything with the
electrical shock and, if so, with what? The results showed
three types of participants: (a) participants who did not
associate the US with anything; (b) participants who made
the wrong association; and (c) participants who identified
the CS–US contingency correctly, albeit partially (for
example, based on the size or the initial letter of the CS+
word). Table 4 shows the percentage of participants within
each perception level who made each kind of association
and the percentage of participants who acquired the CR
according to the type of CS–US association they made.
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants who reached the CR acquisition
criterion (Y axis), according to each visual perceptual threshold
(X axis), in Experiments 1 and 2 together.
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None of the participants from the null perception level
identified the CS–US contingency correctly. On the other
hand, 40% of the participants who identified the CS–US
contingency did not acquire the CR, and 36% of the
participants who did not identify the CS–US contingency
acquired the CR. This suggests that subjective consciousness
of the CS–US contingency is not a necessary or sufficient
condition for conditioning. Even so, consciousness of the
CS–US contingency had differential effects on the probability
of CR acquisition (according to the corresponding
contingency table2, c2 (2, N = 48) = 7.52, p = .02). The
percentage of participants who reached the CR acquisition
criterion was significantly higher among participants who
identified the CS–US contingency than among those who
made the wrong association according to Fisher’s exact test,
p = .01. Significant differences were not observed between
participants who identified the CS–US contingency and those
who made no association, p = .08, nor between the latter
and participants who made the wrong association, p = .15.
Effect Size of Consciousness Concepts in CR
Acquisition
Out of the three consciousness concepts, perceptual
threshold (identification, non-identification, and non-detection),
subjective consciousness (what is associated with the US),
and objective consciousness (whether the number of correct
responses is above or below random), the perceptual threshold
seems to explain the results of the CR acquisition best, with
regard to contingency coefficient values. The contingency
coefficient between CR acquisition and the perceptual threshold
was .436, p = .004, subjective consciousness was .368, p =
.02, and objective consciousness was .024, p = .87. If these
values are transformed into percentages, they can be compared,
regardless of the number of cells in each contingency table3
(see Sachs, 1978). The relationship between CR acquisition
and the perceptual threshold was 62%, subjective consciousness
was 52%, and objective consciousness was 3.4%.
General Discussion
Consciousness and CR Acquisition
The results of the two experiments about the role that
consciousness plays in CR acquisition suggest that
consciousness of the CS–US contingency is not necessary
for CR acquisition by the ANS, as postulated by some
authors (Davey, 1992a). Fifty percent of the participants
who failed to discriminate between a blank screen and one
with a word anticipated the US when a CS+ word was
presented. Stimuli presented below the detection threshold
seem to be processed and associated with biologically-
relevant stimuli for humans (shock), so that after some trials,
their presence stimulates an emotional response.
A new result that emerges from this research is that
unconscious conditioning was possible with neutral stimuli.
To date, in several studies, Öhman and colleagues obtained
conditioned ANS responses to fear-relevant stimuli but not
to visually-masked neutral stimuli (Esteves et al., 1994;
Öhman & Soares, 1998). The discrepancy with our results
could be attributed to the different experimental methodology
used. In our study, perceptual thresholds were established
individually, and consciousness was measured simultaneously
with stimulus presentation throughout the experiment.
Furthermore, a detection threshold was used in conjunction
with an identification threshold, which makes it much more
restrictive and discourages participants from attempting to
guess what they see. Lastly, in the acquisition phase, many
trials were carried out, and the SCR with the CS+ was
compared in each trial to the SCR with the CS–, in order
to determine when the CR appeared.
Conscious Conditioning versus Unconscious
Conditioning
Differentiating, at a theoretical level, two processes that
are exactly the same in practice poses a problem (Brody,
1989; Shanks, 2002). It is not sufficient to guarantee non-
conscious perception of stimuli. If unconscious conditioning
Table 4
Percentage of Participants Who Established Each CS-US
Association According to Their Perception Level
CS–US Perception
Associationa Null Confused Clear
None (28%) 62.5% 61% 25%  
Incorrect (8%) 37.5% 32% 8%  
Correct (60%) 0% 7% 67%
Note. Null Perception = below detection threshold. Confused
Perception = above detection threshold and below identification
threshold. Clear Perception = above identification threshold. 
a The percentage of participants who acquired the CR, according
to the type of CS–US association they made, appears in brackets.
2 The contingency table does not fulfill the requirement that no more than 20% of the cells may have expected values of less than
5, but this is the only way to obtain an index of the joint effect of the three categories.
3 The tables of perceptual threshold and subjective consciousness do not fulfill the requirement that no more than 20% of cells may
have expected values of less than 5.
is identical to conscious conditioning, the inability of
participants to discriminate stimuli could simply be a
methodological device that would not justify such a
distinction. Measures taken to register differences between
the two processes did not provide any significant results.
In the extinction phase, no differences appeared between
the two processes. The CR acquired consciously or
unconsciously disappeared quickly in both cases. This result
is common in studies on conditioning to subliminal visual
stimuli (see Experiment 1 in Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves,
1989). Two factors explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the
CR was recently acquired and had hardly been reinforced.
Secondly, participants were explicitly informed about US
withdrawal to accelerate CR extinction (Dawson & Grings,
1968; Soares & Öhman, 1993a). We now know about the
unsuitability of the two circumstances coinciding, but
extinction of an unconsciously-acquired CR was expected
to be slower than extinction of a consciously-acquired CR,
regardless of the information participants had.
It is necessary to verify the trends identified with regard
to the larger number of trials needed to reach the CR
acquisition criterion and the lower regularity of this
acquisition in unconscious conditioning. The number of
participants who reached the CR acquisition criterion
(consciously and unconsciously) would have to be increased
in order to use more powerful tests. The detection of
differences in the number of trials needed and in the way to
reach the CR acquisition criterion would require an increase
in the number of trials for the acquisition phase and the CRs
needed to reach the CR acquisition criterion, respectively.
This would mean that the CR was more consolidated, thus
delaying extinction. Furthermore, increasing the length of
this phase would involve reducing the threshold establishment
phase in order to avoid prolonging the experiment.
As the participation of consciousness seems to influence
CR acquisition, it may be premature to consider consciousness
as merely the result of unconscious processing, as some authors
propose (Jackendoff, 1987; Velmans, 1991). Our results indicate
that when conditioning is conscious, it tends to be acquired
more quickly and more regularly than when it is unconscious.
According to the personality variables measured, participants
who acquire the CR unconsciously adapt to circumstances more
easily, because they fail to discover why the shock appears,
and they are more spontaneous and adopt a passive attitude
more easily than those who acquire the CR consciously. These
characteristics are related to an attitude that facilitates the
appearance of unconsciously-processed information effects,
and therefore of unconscious conditioning (Dagenbach et al.,
1989; Dixon, 1981; Landis et al., 1992; Marcel, 1983a;
Snodgrass et al., 1993; Van Selst & Merikle, 1993).
Measure of Consciousness
The results obtained in the two experiments indicate a
high ISI variability among participants. If the same threshold
were used for all participants, there would be a high risk of
some participants perceiving clearly and others not perceiving
anything, so that the results would become less reliable.
These results support the criterion held by some authors
whereby the individual setting of perceptual thresholds is a
necessary condition for guaranteeing perception without
consciousness (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Holender, 1986;
Merikle, 1982; Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
The instability of some participants’ perceptual thresholds
during the experiment (whereby participants responded
correctly above random when acting below the conscious
threshold) underlines the importance of using simultaneous
measures (trial-by-trial) of consciousness, as the most reliable
way of guaranteeing that participants are working at an
unconscious level. This instability could be a consequence
of individual differences4 (vision, concentration, having slept
well, etc.), chance (a highly restrictive criterion was used),
practice (Wolford, Marchak, & Hughes, 1988), increased
alertness due to US presence, the break between phases, or
a combination of some or all of these. However, as ISI
stability is greater with identification judgments (84%) than
with detection judgments (45%), it cannot be explained only
by these variables, because all were equally present in the
two experiments. Another possible explanation is the different
type of task used in each experiment. Thus, the instability
of detection thresholds could be attributed to the influence
of unconscious information that increases performance above
random. Direct measures of consciousness could be affected
by unconscious information processing, as occurs in priming
and in unconscious conditioning tasks (Berry, 1994; Bowers,
1984; Reber, 1989). On the other hand, the stability of
identification thresholds, which fosters a search for and
interpretation of consciously-perceived signals, could be a
consequence of the limited capacity of conscious activity,
which cannot be extended by effort (Mandler, 1992).
Although consciousness is a subjective experience, using
a subjective measure of consciousness does not seem fruitful,
as when participants say that they cannot see anything, with
a certain margin of error due to benevolence or to
participants’ uncertainty when valuing their own perception,
one can speculate about unconscious perception, but one
cannot guarantee that participants have stopped attempting
to discriminate the little they can see. The use of the
objective detection threshold is a better guarantee that most
participants relax their conscious activity as there are no
clues or signals to interpret.
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4 Within unconscious groups, there was only one significant difference (U = 61.5, p = .046) in the C Factor (Emotional Stability) of
the 16PF between participants who were excluded in the CR acquisition phase, as their perception was above random (n = 12, M = 5.8,
SD = 2.3), and participants who remained working at a nonconscious level (n = 18, M = 7.4, SD = 1.9).
Conscious and Unconscious Interaction
Many authors argue that conscious activity takes
precedence over unconscious activity, especially in unknown
situations (Pribram & Martín, 1995; Rumelhart, 1977;
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Thanks to this precedence of
conscious activity, we find our behavior appropriate. Our
behavior would be most disconcerting if unconscious activity
took precedence over conscious activity. Our behavior would
be independent of our own decisions, and of our perception
of ourselves and the world. This precedence of conscious
activity would explain the difficulty in achieving conditioning
at the confused perception level, as conscious processing of
the “remaining” stimuli would inhibit the processing of
unconscious information (Bornstein, 1992; Dagenbach et
al., 1989; Dixon, 1981; Landis et al., 1992; Marcel, 1983a,
1983b; Snodgrass et al., 1993; Van Selst & Merikle, 1993).
Participants would be responding to speculations created by
these “remnants,” and not to real contingency (Berry, 1994;
Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor,
1980; Turner & Fischler, 1993).
Unconscious information would be used in non-
emergency situations, that is, mainly during moments of
conscious passivity, or would, exceptionally, burst into
consciousness totally or partially if it were relevant for the
organism (Cherry, 1953). The way it bursts into consciousness
would be through emotional reactions (UR or CR of
Autonomous Nervous System) in most cases (Bower, 1981;
Damasio, 1994; De Houwer et al., 1997; Frijda, 1988; Izard,
1977; Krosnick, Betz, Jussin, & Lynn, 1992; Murphy &
Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1980). Thus, although a stimulus would
not be perceived consciously, if necessary, its unconscious
processing could trigger an emotional reaction to prepare the
organism to receive it and to find the necessary resources
and the most appropriate response for resolving the situation
(Katkin, 2001). In emergency situations, it is important for
the organism’s reaction to occur first, without the option of
conscious activity blocking it. Preparing oneself to give a
response is a higher priority than knowing what has caused
the reaction. If our city’s emergency systems (police, fire,
ambulance services) did not respond to calls until they had
received all the information about the situations facing them,
they would probably be of no use to us. Their efficiency
depends on rapid response. If they arrive late, what will have
been the use of knowing exactly why they were called out?
As the thalamus, the main route through which information
is received from sensorial receptors, has a direct connection
to the amygdala, which is related to emotional responses, it
permits the latter to react 40 ms before the sensorial areas
of the neocortex. This is because the thalamus has more
complex connections to these areas of the neocortex, and
this provides neurological support for the priority of an
emotional response over a cognitive one (Iwata, LeDoux,
Meeley, Arneric, & Reis, 1986; LeDoux, 1990, 1996;
LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988).
In Pavlovian conditioning, the CS is linked to the affective
state generated by the US, and it does not seem reasonable
that this mechanism is blocked when the processed stimulus
is not a spider, a snake, or an angry face (for an alternative
explanation, see Öhman, 2000). Our results show that masked
neutral stimuli could be effective signals to be associated
with and to activate emotional states in appropriate conditions.
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